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Case Comments
International Law Cases in National Courts
RICHARD C. ALLISON,* Departmental Editor

A number of cases involving questions of international law have
been decided recently by federal, state and local courts.
Antitrust Law-"Foreign Commerce"
Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific FarEast Line, Inc., 404 F.2d
804 (D.C. Cir. 1968) involves a determination of whether the plaintiffs
were engaged in foreign commerce for purposes of the application of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The Circuit Court heard this
case on appeal from a decision by the District Court to dismiss the
complaint at the close of oral argument, apparently because there was
no claim of restraint of foreign commerce.
According to the complaint the plaintiffs, operators of United
States flag vessels, were engaged in selling their services to exporters
of cement and fertilizer in Taiwan and Thailand. These exporters
needed American flag shipping for their sales to South Vietnamese
importers, since the importers would be paid the shipping expense if
American flag vessels were used.
Plaintiffs sought to establish themselves in this specialized
market by using older, less costly vessels than those used by the
defendants, the principal suppliers of this market for American flag
vessels. The 21 defendant American shipping lines, members of the 2
defendant shipping conferences, were organized in an association
which set the rates for transporting cargoes of foreign origin from one
foreign port to another. Neither these rates nor the articles of the
association were filed with the Federal Maritime Commission.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, in pursuit of a conspiracy to
block the plaintiffs, first asked AID for a directive limiting AID-fi* Member of the New York Bar. Assisted by Michael L. Owen of the New York and
California Bars.
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nanced shipping to "conference liners." AID refused to cooperate
and even countermanded a ruling of the Director General of Commerce of South Vietnam that only association members could carry
these shipments. When the Defense Department also refused to
cooperate, the defendants, at a meeting of the association threw open
their rate schedule on shipments from Taiwan and Thailand to South
Vietnam. The rates dropped about 45%, forcing plaintiffs out of
business. Thereafter, the defendants raised their rates to a new high.
The principal issue in the case as formulated by the Court was
"[w]hether the District Court was correct in its jurisdictional determination that the complaint made no allegation of restraint on United
States foreign commerce." (404 F.2d at 811).
The defendants contended that United States foreign commerce
is not restrained in violation of the Sherman Act unless the effect is
on commodity imports or exports or transportation to or from the
United States. Since the plaintiffs' service was to ship foreign goods
from one foreign port to another, the defendants argued, there could
be no foreign commerce involved.
The court first examines the broad concept of commerce as
treated by Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) and the
economic effects of such trade on United States balance of payments
and domestic commerce accounts in determining that this class of
sale of services is within the Constitutional grant to Congress to
regulate "commerce with foreign nations."
Turning then to the application of the Sherman Act to this type
of commerce, the court treats the possible international complications involved. The court points out that most international controversy in this area has arisen from application of United States'
antitrust laws to foreigners for acts not done in the United States,
citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443
(2nd Cir. 1945) for its statement that:
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which
the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.
...

The court indicates, however, that no such international complications exist in this case since the defendants are nationals of the
United States and nationality is a recognized basis for regulating
conduct.
Acknowledging that the issue is one of first impression, the court
holds that:
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. there is an identifiable, distinctive market for American-flag shipping service

where the American characteristic is dominant-a market defined as involving
the transportation of AID-financed cargoes, which has a definite nexus with
significant interest of the United States-the Sherman Act is applicable to a
conspiracy to exclude newcomers from the trade. (404 F. 2D at 816).

In so doing the court emphasizes that this conclusion was
influenced by recognition that the trade in question "is entirely a
product of the United States policy of subsidizing its merchant
marine." (404 F. 2d at 816). Furthermore, only Americans can serve
this market. These American contacts and nexus, the court suggests,
provide objective standards which may usefully supplement the most
frequently stated test (found in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, supra, at 443-444.) as to whether the Sherman Act is
applicable to acts without the United States, i.e., whether the parties
intended to and did affect United States imports and exports.
Determination of Boundaries-Coastal Waters
In United States v. State of Louisiana (The LouisianaBoundary
Case), U. S.
, 89 S. Ct. 773 (1969), the United States
Supreme Court upheld its decision in United States v. California,381
U.S. 139, 85 S. Ct. 1401 (1965) to adopt the definitions from the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964]
15 U.S.T. (pt. 2) 1607, T.I.A.S. 5639, for purposes of the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315, and indicated that such
definitions should be used in determining certain boundary lines of
Louisiana.'
The stake in deciding which definition to apply, as indicated by
Mr. Justice Black in his dissent in The Louisiana Boundary Case, is
whether the Federal Government or Louisiana will have the power to
lease the submerged land to oil companies. The "Inland Water Line,"
determined pursuant to federal legislation adopted in 1895; is favored
by Louisiana for it is an established boundary line apportioning the
land in a manner acceptable to Louisiana. The Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, on the other hand, defines
1 The opinion in a second case, United States v. State of Louisiana (The Texas Boundary
Case),
- U.S.
-,
89 S.Ct. 768 (1969), handed down the same day also applied the
definitions of the Convention in determining the Texas coastline for purposes of the Submerged
Lands Act. Only the opinion in The Louisiana Boundary Case, however, discussed international legal principles and their application; the summary that follows is, therefore, limited to
that case.
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"coastline" to be the modern, ambulatory coastline, whether modified by natural or artificial means.
In the Californiacase the Supreme Court based its choice of the
definitions contained in the Convention in part on the desirability of
''a single coastline for both the administration of the Submerged
Lands Act and the conduct of our future international relations."
(381 U.S. at 165, 85 S.Ct. at 1415) In The Louisiana Boundary Case
Louisiana argued that this Convention was not meant to be the sole
measure of inland or territorial waters or to divest a nation of waters
which it long considered its own and that the continuous and
unopposed regulation of navigation within the "Inland Water Line"
should establish this line as the boundary for inland waters according
to the principles of international law, notwithstanding the definitions
contained in the Convention and applied in the California case.
Alternatively, Louisiana argued that the "Inland Water Line" as an
assertion of sovereignty comes within the exception of Article 7 of
the Convention for "historic bays."
The Supreme Court rejected both of these contentions, finding
that "nothing in either the enactment of the 1895 Act or its
administration indicates that the United States has ever treated [the
"Inland Water Line"] as a territorial boundary." (89 S. Ct. 780) Justice
Steward quotes the Californiacase (381 U.S. at 172, 85 S. Ct. at 1419)
to the effect that historic title can be claimed only when the "coastal
nation has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion with the
acquiescence of foreign nations." The determination of the "Inland
Water Line" was made solely as an aid to regulate navigation, and the
Supreme Court finds universal agreement that "the reasonable regulation of navigation is not alone a sufficient exercise of dominion to
constitute a claim to historic inland waters." (89 S.Ct. at 781) Such
regulation is deemed an incident of the coastal nation's jurisdiction
over the territorial sea, as contrasted with its complete sovereignty
over the nearest zone to the nation's shores, its inland waters.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court leaves open the possibility, to
be determined in the first instance by a Special Master, that the
waters of the Mississippi River Delta are "historic bays" within the
meaning of Article 7 of the Convention, apparently without reference
to the "Inland Water Line," and directs the Master to consider
relevant any exercises of dominion by Louisiana in determining the
existence of historic title.
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The Court describes the three zones of the navigable seas as
follows:
Under generally accepted principles of international law, the navigable sea is
divided into three zones, distinguished by the nature of the control which the
contiguous nation can exercise over them. Nearest to the nation's shores are its
inland, or internal waters. These are subject to the complete sovereignty of the
nation, as much as if they were a part of its land territory, and the coastal nation
has the privilege even to exclude foreign vessels altogether. Beyond the inland
waters, and measured from their seaward edge, is a belt known as the marginal,
or territorial sea. Within it the coastal nation may exercise extensive control but
cannot deny the right of innocent passage to foreign nations. Outside the
territorial sea are the high seas, which are international waters not subject to the
dominion of any single nation.
Whether particular waters are inland has depended on historical as well as
geographical factors. Certain shoreline configuration have been deemed to
confine bodies of water, such as bays, which are necessarily inland. But it has
also been recognized that other areas of water closely connected to the shore,
although they do not meet any precise geographical test, may have achieved the
status of inland waters by the manner in which they have been treated by the
coastal nation. (89 S.Ct. at 780-781)

Louisiana also contended that acceptance of the "Inland Water
Line" will fulfill the "requirements of definiteness and stability which
should attend any congressional grant of property rights belonging to

the United States," quoting from the court's opinion in the California
case, 381 U.S. at 167, 85 S. Ct. at 1416. Louisiana emphasized that,
whereas the Convention's definition providing for an ambulatory

coastline would furnish the desired "definiteness and stability" for
California because of its comparatively straight rocky coastline, the
same definition applied to the constantly shifting Louisiana coastline
molded by the vagaries of the Mississippi River and the Gulf storms

would produce uncertainty and endless litigation. The Supreme Court
took up this argument in connection with whether areas between the
mainland and fringes of outer islands constitute inland waters. The

court notes that the Convention allows for straight baselines in
defining the coastline rather than the ambulatory coastline as a
recognition of the principle established in the Fisheries Case (United
Kingdom v. Norway)[1951) I.C.J. 116, for those nations with island
fringes along their shore. Such straight baselines, however, are

optional with the coastal nation.
The Supreme Court in the passage quoted below does appear to
recognize the distinction Louisiana draws between its own coast and

that of California, but chobses to exercise judicial restraint in refusing
to apply the straight baseline method:
International Law'yer, Vol. 3, No. 4
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..While we agree that the straight baseline method was designed for precisely
such coasts as the Mississippi River Delta area, we adhere to the position that
the selection of this optional method of establishing boundaries should be left to

the branches of Government responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. It would be inappropriate for this Court to review or
overturn the considered decision of the United States, albeit paritally motivated
by a domestic concern, not to extend its borders to the furthest extent consonant
with international law. (89 S. Ct. 807)

The court concluded its opinion by providing for the appointment of a Special Master to make a preliminary determination of the
Louisiana boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico in accord with this
decision.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice
Douglas, would apply the "Inland Water Line" in defining the
Louisiana coastline for the reasons of certainty and stability advanced by Louisiana, and to relieve the courts of burdensome
litigation which otherwise would result. The dissenting opinion also
contains this interesting rejoinder to the majority:
There appears to be one thing certain about the problem, however, and that is
that the dispute between Louisiana and the United States is no part of
international affairs subject to international law, but is exclusively a domestic
controversy between the State and Nation. (89 S.Ct. at 813)

Outer Continental Shelf-Proprietary Interests in Coral Reef
In a recent case in the Southern District of Florida likened by the
court to a fairy tale, two separate groups of colonizers failed in their
claim to have established new island nations on several coral reefs
located four and one-half miles off the southeast coast of Florida,
near Miami. In United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla.
1969), both the defendant, Ray, and the intervenor, Atlantis, representing a second group of entrepreneurs, planned sizable real estate
developments on the nearly submerged reefs and each of the two
groups envisioned an independent island nation. The Atlantis group
had plans for a mint, and international bank with numbered accounts
and a gambling casino.
Prior to the United States' action to permanently enjoin defendant's dredging, filling and other activities, both the defendant and the
intervenor had placed structures on the reefs.
Chief Judge Fulton refused to uphold the first contention of the
Government that the activities of the defendant constituted a trespass
International Lawyer. Vol. 3, No. 4
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on reefs that are part of the United States Outer Continental Shelf.
He did find that these reefs, because of their submerged nature and
location, are part of the "seabed and subsoil" of the United States
Outer Continental Shelf as defined by both the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1331-1343) and by the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf (15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. 5578).
He further found that these coral reefs constitute "natural resources"as defined in the aforementioned Act and Convention and
that evidence demonstrated that defendant's dredging and filling of
the reefs and further work planned by both the defendant and
intervenor would irreparably injure these natural resources.
Nevertheless, there was no trespass since the United States is
not in actual possession of the reefs, nor apparently has it ever
claimed actual title to them. The court found that Congress intended
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to assert "a less comprehensive interest" in the Continental Shelf than was granted to the States by
the Submerged Lands Act (43 U.S.C.§§1301-1303, 1311-1315) over
the land beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the
States. This interest in the Continental Shelf has been judicially
determined to be less than a fee simple, and the distinction between
complete sovereignty over coastal waters and the lesser interest in
the Outer Continental Shelf is found to comport with international
law.
The United States was upheld on its second claim, however, that
the construction on these reefs by the defendants and the intervenor
were unlawful in the absence of a permit from the Secretary of the
Army. The requirement of this permit is contained in Section 10 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §403; the authority of
the Secretary of the Army, thereunder, is extended by the Outer
Continental Shelf Land Act, 43 U.S.C. §1333(f).
The ownership claims of both the defendant and the intervenor
were found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Outer
Continental Shelf Land Act and with those of the 1958 Geneva
Convention of the Continental Shelf. "Whatever proprietary interest
exists with respect to these reefs belongs to the United States under
both national (Shelf Act) and international (Shelf Convention) law.
Although this interest may be limited, it is nevertheless the only
interest recognized by law, and such interest in the United States
precludes the claims of the defendants and intervenor" (294 F. Supp.
at 542).
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 4
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Treaties-Tax Discrimination
In Schieffelin & Co. v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 53 (Cust. Ct.
1968) the plaintiffs, importers of both Irish and Scottish spirits,
objected to alleged discrimination in the assessment of the United
States tax on spirits in violation of treaties with Ireland and Great
Britain.
The spirits imported by the plaintiffs are bottled and ready for
consumption at approximately 85 proof. Since these spirits are below
100 proof, the United States' tax on spirits is levied against these
imports at a rate based on the "wine gallon." In comparison,
domestic producers withdraw their liquor from bond at not less than
100 proof, and, because of the high proof, are subject to the tax at the
same rate, but based on the "proof gallon," a measure of liquid
somewhat larger than the "wine gallon." Plaintiffs alleged discrimination since, in order to be taxed on the more favorable "proof gallon"
basis, they must import in bulk at 100 proof or above and then have
the spirits diluted and bottled in the United States, thereby possibly
reducing the quality of plaintiffs' product.
The question for the court, therefore, was whether this difference
in tax assessment violates the respective treaties of Ireland and Great
Britain with the United States. Article XVI of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and
Ireland, entered into force on September 14, 1950, provides as
follows:
1.Products of either Party shall be accorded, within the territories of the other
party, national and most-favoured-nation treatment in all matters affecting
internal taxation and sale, distribution, storage and use. I U.S.T. 788, 797.

Article XXI of this same treaty provides:
1. The term 'national treatment' means treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favourable than the treatment accorded
therein, in like situations, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or other
objects, as the case may be, of such Party. 1 U.S.T. 788, 801.

The treaty between the United States and Great Britain (8 Stat.
228) entered into force July 3, 1815, likewise contains a most-favoured-nation clause.
In rejecting plaintiffs' claim of discrimination in violation of the
treaties, the court found that "[u]nderproof imported spirits (bottled)
and proof or overproof domestic spirits (bulk) at the time of tax
International Lawvyer, Vol. 3, No. 4
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determination do not involve 'like situations,' and consequently, the
provisions of Articles XVI and XXI of the Irish treaty are not
applicable here." The court also emphasized that the importers
have the option of importing in bulk and paying the same rates as do
American distillers.
Trusts and Estates-Iron Curtain Statute
In Estate of Fred Hinz, N.Y.L.J., March 10, 1969, p. 17, col.2
(Sur. Ct. N.Y. County), petitioner, a resident of the Russian Zone of
Occupation of Germany, sought to withdraw funds deposited with
the Director of Finance of the City of New York pursuant to the
provisions of New York's "Iron Curtain" statute, SCPA §2218
(McKinney Supp. 1968) (formerly SCA 269-a). In support of his
demand, petitioner cited Zscherning v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,88 S.Ct.
664 (1968) which struck down the application of an "Iron Curtain"
statute in Oregon.
Surrogate Di Falco in denying petitioner's application cited the
New York Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Zscherning case
(Matter of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346 (1968) to the effect that
the Oregon statute, itself, was not unconstitutional, but rather the
Oregon court's application of the statute which interfered with
United States' foreign affairs.
Surrogate Di Falco pointed out further that the New York
statute, as amended effective June 22, 1968, is designed not to
interfere with United States' foreign policy since the statute's application is triggered only by a ruling or determination of the Federal
Government:
1. (a) Where it shall appear that an alien legatee, distributee or beneficiary is
domiciled or resident within a country to which checks or warrants drawn
against funds of the United States may not be transmitted by reason of any
executive order, regulation or similar determination of the United States
government or any department or agency thereof, the court shall direct that the
money or property to which such alien would otherwise be entitled shall be paid
into court for the benefit of said alien or the person or persons who thereafter
may appear to be entitled thereto. SCPA §2218 (McKinney Supp. 1968).

Since the Russian Zone of Occupation of East Germany is listed
by the United States Treasury Department is an area to which checks
drawn on United States' funds may not be sent and there being no
reasonable assurance that persons in petitioner's situation would
receive the funds, petitioner's application was denied.
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 4
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Warsaw Convention-Limitation on Liability
The jury award was upheld in Stolk v. Compagnie NationaleAir
France,N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 22, Cols. 3-6 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.) on
the trial level in New York involving the defense of a limitation on
liability for loss of luggage during a flight governed by the provisions
of the Warsaw Convention [Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000,
TS 876 (1929)].
On trial the jury awarded the plaintiff $2,000 damages for loss of
two pieces of luggage during her flight on defendant's airline from
New York to Paris. Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict as to all claims in excess of $330. Defendant claimed that
its liability was so limited by Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention or,
in the alternative, by the Local and Joint International Passenger
Rules Tariff No. PR-2 which defendant had filed with the Civil
Aeronautics Board pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §1373(a).
As to the liability limitations the trial judge pointed out that two
previous cases had treated this same problem under the Warsaw
Convention in regard to limitations on liability for death or personal
injury. In Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., (341 F.2d 851, 856 (2nd
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816), the Court held that the
passenger ticket must be delivered in a manner providing the
passenger a reasonable opportunity to protect against the liability
limitations on personal injury and death. In Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., (253 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd
370 F.2d 508 (2nd Cir.), aff'd by evenly divided ct., 390 U.S. 455)
limitations on liability for personal injury or death "so artfully
camouflaged that their presence is concealed" were held not to
constitute notice to the passenger.
These two cases were so decided despite any specific requirement in the Warsaw Convention that the limitation be printed on the
passenger ticket. The judge pointed out, therefore, that the principles
of these cases should apply a fortiori in this case since the Convention specifically denies the defense of limited liability on lost luggage
unless that limitation appears on the baggage ticket. The miniscule
statement of the limitation on the baggage ticket was, accordingly,
given no effect.
The trial judge also held that the notice printed in ten point type
relating to limitations on liability for death and personal injury was
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 4
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insufficient to put plaintiff on notice of the Convention's baggage
liability limitation.
Finally, the judge held that this flight, being an international flight
rather than a domestic flight, came within the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention and not the aforementioned tariff rules filed
with the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was,
therefore, denied, and the defendant was held liable in the amount of
$2,000.
Admissibility of Evidence Seized in Border Search
Refusal to pay customs duty upon entry into Canada proved a
little more costly than anticipated to three defendants in a recent
decision ruling on a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a border
search.
In People v. DeLoach, 297 N.Y.S. 2d 220 (Buffalo City Ct.
1969), defendants had attempted to enter Canada by car but were
denied admission by Canadian Customs Service when one defendant
refused to pay approximately $10.00 duty on certain publications
which he claimed to have edited and published. Defendants then
turned around, crossed back over the Peace Bridge into the United
States, whereupon they were stopped at the United States Customs
Compound and, despite their explanation of what had just happened,
found their car subjected to a thorough search. As a result, an action
was brought against them for possession of marijuana.
In the course of upholding the search and the admissibility of the
evidence, seized, Judge Kasler ruled that the defendants' departure
from the United States was effective and complete when they had
crossed the boundary line midway over the Niagara River and that it
was of no consequence in ruling on the legality of the search that the
defendants had no opportunity to purchase any Canadian goods
subject to duty.
Furthermore, the Judge upheld the search even though it was not
based on suspicion of illegal importation of goods subject to duty, but
rather suspicion that defendants had goods unlawful to possess.
Nor was there any obligation on the part of the United States
Customs Officials to contact their Canadian counterparts to verify
defendants' story. Such a duty, the Judge found, would in effect make
probable cause a requirement for a border search, contrary to the
case of Alexander v. United States, 362 F. 2d 379, 382 (9 Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977, 87 S. Ct. 519.
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